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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
I demonstrate that frequent repurchasers resemble dividend payers and their repurchases are sticky 
and inflexible, like dividends. In contrast, infrequent repurchasers follow a flexible buyback policy 
and quickly respond to earnings changes. Investors react more positively to infrequent 
repurchasers’ repurchase announcements and actual repurchases, consistent with stronger signals 
of undervaluation and improvement in future prospects. Frequent repurchasers, however, 
repurchase to offset dilution caused by equity compensation. The shift in repurchase behavior from 
infrequent to frequent explains why traditional motives such as flexibility and signaling fail to 
describe the recent surge in repurchases.  
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1. Introduction 
Repurchases have become a dominant form of payout, with more than half of US firms 
repurchasing in a year and the total amount of repurchases exceeding 650 billion dollars in 2016. 
Prior literature consistently identifies maintaining financial flexibility, signaling future prospects, 
and controlling dilution as three key reasons that firms prefer repurchases over dividends.1 Skinner 
(2008) shows that firms have substituted dividends with repurchases because they are more 
flexible. Despite this, dividends have more than doubled during the last decade, and almost a 
quarter of all firms use both dividends and repurchases to distribute cash to shareholders in recent 
years.  
Prior studies typically compare repurchases with dividends to determine repurchase 
motives. Since more than half of US firms have been repurchasing in recent years, it is also 
important to understand variation in repurchase motives. Once firms decide to repurchase, they 
may concentrate their repurchases in one quarter or spread them over multiple quarters. I exploit 
this variation in repurchase frequency to identify underlying repurchase motives. When firms 
repurchase frequently, investors upwardly revise expectations regarding the likelihood of future 
repurchases, thus rendering firms reluctant to cut existing repurchases in response to earnings 
shocks; these repurchases then become sticky like dividends. In contrast, when firms repurchase 
infrequently, their repurchases are unexpected and will convey a stronger positive signal.  
To test this hypothesis, in each fiscal year, I classify firms that repurchase in three or four 
quarters as “frequent” repurchasers, in two quarters as “moderate” repurchasers, in one quarter as 
                                                 
1 Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) show that dividends are implicitly 
permanent commitments, while repurchases provide firms with financial flexibility, as they do not commit firms to 
future payouts. Dittmar (2000) examines various motives for repurchases and concludes that signaling undervaluation 
is a consistent predictor across time. Vermaelen (1984) and Ofer and Thakor (1987) suggest that firms repurchase to 
disclose privately held information by managers. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) show that the positive long-run returns 
following repurchases have persisted across time. Kahle (2002) finds that firms repurchase to mitigate dilution in EPS 
on account of grants and exercises of employee stock options. 
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“infrequent” repurchasers, and in zero quarters as “no repurchases.” The fraction of all 
repurchasers classified as infrequent declines from 43% in 1991 to 21% in 2016, while the 
percentage of frequent repurchasers increases from 27% in 1991 to 55% in 2016.2 Further, the 
number of repurchasers increased sharply between 2003 and 2007, which coincides with the 
growth in frequent repurchasers. Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz (2014) find that flexibility 
and signaling fail to explain the recent surge in repurchases. If frequent repurchasers are less likely 
to repurchase for signaling and flexibility, then their increasing proportion potentially explains 
why these motives do not explain the growth in repurchases. 
I begin by examining the characteristics of frequent versus infrequent repurchasers. Prior 
studies find that smaller and younger firms with variable income and high investments prefer 
repurchases to dividends (Fama and French, 2001; Guffey and Schneider, 2004). While infrequent 
repurchasers exhibit these characteristics, frequent repurchasers are mature companies with stable 
earnings, high profitability, and low investments. Thus, frequent repurchasers are similar to 
traditional dividend payers. I then examine whether repurchase frequency can help distinguish 
between the three well-known motivations of repurchases: flexibility, signaling, and dilution. 
 I start with the flexibility motive of repurchases. I hypothesize that repurchases by frequent 
firms have characteristics similar to dividends and that such firms engage in repurchase smoothing. 
To test this hypothesis, I first examine the extent to which firms vary repurchases with changes in 
earnings. I find that frequent repurchasers are significantly more averse to reducing repurchases; 
they reduce repurchases in 29% of the years in which earnings decline, compared to 51% for 
infrequent repurchasers. I then estimate Lintner-model regressions for repurchases to examine 
whether frequent repurchasers are slower to respond to changes in earnings. My estimated speed 
                                                 
2 The decline in infrequent repurchasers is despite a sharp increase in the number of repurchasers. The percentage of 
US firms that repurchase in a year has increased from 25% in 1991 to 51% in 2016.  
11 
 
of adjustment coefficient for frequent repurchasers is 0.28, significantly lower than the coefficient 
of 0.54 for infrequent repurchasers. This difference indicates that frequent repurchasers take more 
time to change repurchases with changes in earnings.3   
As a final test for flexibility, I examine the effect of income permanence on payout 
decisions. Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) show that repurchases are more flexible 
than dividends because firms use dividends to distribute permanent income and use repurchases to 
distribute temporary income. I extend this analysis by differentiating between repurchases by 
frequent and infrequent firms. My results show that frequent firms behave like dividend payers 
and use repurchases to distribute permanent income. They are more likely to increase repurchases 
when operating income increases but are less likely to do so when income volatility increases. In 
comparison, infrequent firms are less likely to increase repurchases when operating income 
increases and more likely to increase repurchases when income volatility increases. Overall, these 
results indicate that frequent repurchasers engage in repurchase smoothing and use repurchases to 
distribute permanent income, similar to dividends. Infrequent repurchasers, however, repurchase 
to distribute temporary and volatile income and adopt a flexible repurchase policy. 
 Next, I explore the signaling motive of repurchases. I start with the undervaluation aspect 
of signaling. I create Peyer and Vermaelen’s (2009) undervaluation index (U-index), which 
increases with undervaluation likelihood. Using U-index as a proxy for undervaluation, I find that 
infrequent repurchasers are more likely to be undervalued and less likely to be overvalued than 
frequent repurchasers across all periods. I then estimate a logit model to determine the effect of 
undervaluation on firms’ repurchase decisions. I find that compared to frequent repurchasers, 
                                                 
3 Lintner (1956) regresses changes in dividends on current earnings and past dividends. The coefficient of past 
dividends denotes the speed with which firms adjust payouts to changes in earnings. A sticky payout policy implies a 
lower speed of adjustment as firms do not want to roll back payouts. 
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infrequent repurchasers are 5.3% more likely to repurchase when undervalued and 8.5% less likely 
to repurchase when overvalued.  
Further, the undervaluation motive implies that firms are more likely to repurchase 
following negative returns (Kahle, 2002). Therefore, as the next test for undervaluation, I examine 
abnormal returns around repurchase quarters. The results show that in the quarter prior to 
repurchases, infrequent repurchasers realize significantly lower abnormal returns than frequent 
repurchasers (CAPM alpha is lower by 0.48% and FF three-factor alpha is lower by 0.47%). In 
addition, investors view infrequent repurchases more positively; in the quarter following 
repurchases, infrequent repurchasers realize 1.1% higher CAPM alpha and 0.71% higher FF three-
factor alpha than frequent repurchasers. To mitigate the concerns that my results are driven by 
mean reversion of returns or differences in firm characteristics, I regress abnormal returns 
following repurchases on a repurchase indicator and control for prior returns and firm 
characteristics. I find that infrequent repurchases are associated with 1.9% higher CAPM alpha 
and 1.2% higher FF three-factor alpha than frequent repurchases. Thus, my results support the 
notion that repurchases by infrequent firms are more strongly motivated by undervaluation than 
repurchases by frequent firms. 
Next, I examine the aspect of signaling related to the disclosure of new information. I 
hypothesize that repurchases by infrequent firms are more informative than repurchases by 
frequent firms. The higher abnormal returns following repurchases by infrequent repurchasers 
support my assertion. I build upon these results and conduct the following tests to isolate the 
information content of repurchases. I begin by comparing five-day cumulative abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements (EARs) for repurchase and non-repurchase quarters. When firms 
announce earnings, investors learn about both quarterly operating performance and repurchases. 
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Since repurchases provide a positive signal about future performance, when firms report earnings 
above (below) analyst estimates, repurchases provide complementary (contrasting) information 
about future prospects. Therefore, differences in EARs between repurchase and non-repurchase 
quarters should proxy for the information content of repurchases. The univariate analysis shows 
that infrequent repurchasers realize significantly higher EARs in repurchase quarters, compared to 
non-repurchase quarters. The differences in EARs are even higher when “infrequent” firms report 
earnings below mean analyst estimates, consistent with “infrequent” firms using repurchases to 
mitigate adverse market reactions. In contrast, EARs for frequent repurchasers do not vary 
significantly with repurchases. The results hold in a regression setting after controlling for earnings 
surprises and firm characteristics.  
I next compare post-earnings announcement drifts (PEAD) for repurchase and non-
repurchase quarters. Prior studies show that firms with positive (negative) news continue to 
generate positive (negative) returns for sixty days after the earnings announcements (Ball and 
Brown, 1968; Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin, 1984; Bernard and Thomas, 1989). If repurchases 
provide information separate from earnings, the upward drifts should be stronger when positive 
earnings surprises coincide with repurchases, as repurchases complement the positive news from 
earnings. Meanwhile, the downward drifts should be weaker for bad news quarters, as the positive 
effect of repurchases would mitigate the negative effect of weak earnings. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, I find that abnormal returns following positive earnings surprises that coincide with 
repurchases show stronger upward drifts for both frequent and infrequent repurchasers. However, 
the incremental drift for repurchase quarters (versus non-repurchase quarters) is significantly 
stronger for infrequent repurchasers compared to frequent repurchasers.  
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The effect of repurchases on drifts is even higher when firms announce earnings below 
analyst estimates. Though the market initially reacts negatively to weak earnings, the cumulative 
abnormal returns following repurchases turn positive by the 10th trading day for infrequent 
repurchasers. In comparison, it takes 22 trading days for the CARs to turn positive for frequent 
repurchasers. Further, when repurchases coincide with negative earnings surprises, infrequent 
repurchasers realize an incremental drift of 4.2% (versus non-repurchase quarters), significantly 
higher than an incremental drift of 1.7% for “frequent” firms. These results show that repurchases 
conducted by “infrequent” firms convey more information than repurchases by “frequent” firms. 
Finally, I explore dilution as the likely motive for frequent repurchasers. Kahle (2002) 
shows that firms repurchase to offset increases in the number of shares outstanding caused by 
equity compensation. Because repurchases by frequent firms are spread across the year, they can 
align their repurchases with the grants and exercises of employee stock options. Therefore, I expect 
dilution to be a stronger motive for such firms. To test this hypothesis, I regress repurchases on 
total stock options outstanding, exercised, and granted. Consistent with my assertion, I find that 
compared to infrequent repurchasers, frequent repurchasers have significantly higher coefficients 
for total options outstanding and exercised. The results are similar when I use executive stock 
options instead of options held by all the employees. These results suggest that dilution is a 
stronger motive for frequent repurchasers than for infrequent repurchasers. 
This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of payout policy. First, I show 
that frequent repurchasers, which constitute more than half of total repurchasers in 2016, 
repurchase in a manner similar to how they would distribute dividends. They engage in repurchase 
smoothing and use repurchases to distribute permanent income. Further, their repurchases lack 
signaling power. Therefore, the increasing proportion of frequent repurchasers can explain the 
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findings of recent studies (Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz, 2014; Obernberger, 2014; Fu and 
Huang, 2015) that traditional repurchase motives do not account for the overall growth in 
repurchases.  
Second, I examine variation in repurchase motives within repurchasers. This approach 
separates me from prior studies (Dittmar, 2000; Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005; 
Skinner, 2008), which compare repurchases with dividends to determine repurchase motives. I 
show that repurchase frequency helps separate firms that repurchase for flexibility and signaling 
(infrequent repurchasers) from firms that repurchase to control dilution (frequent repurchasers). 
My results have two key implications. First, factoring in repurchase frequency would make trading 
strategies exploiting the repurchase anomaly (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2008) more profitable 
because infrequent repurchasers realize higher repurchase announcement returns, and their 
repurchases are followed by higher abnormal returns. Second, the effect of repurchases on other 
corporate decisions such as investments may vary with repurchase frequency.4    
This paper also adds to the literature that relates repurchase characteristics with repurchase 
frequency. I extend the findings of Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) by analyzing actual 
repurchases rather than repurchase announcements. This approach allows me to capture the 
repurchase activities of firms more precisely. Though the percentage of US firms repurchasing in 
a year has increased from 30% in 1990 to 51% in 2016, the number of repurchase announcements 
has declined by 45% during this period. Of the firms that repurchased in 2016, only 26% 
announced a repurchase plan during the year, compared to 59% in 1990. Thus, announcements 
alone do not completely capture the repurchase activities of firms anymore. Further, while 
                                                 
4 Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) find that firms may forego value accretive projects to maintain 
dividends. As frequent repurchasers are reluctant to cut repurchases, their repurchases may affect investments 
differently than repurchases by “infrequent” firms. 
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Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) focus on the signaling motive of repurchases, I explore other 
aspects as well, such as flexibility, dilution, and disclosure of new information. 
Finally, my findings shed light on the concentration of market timing in infrequent 
repurchasers (Dittmar and Field, 2015). While Dittmar and Field (2015) highlight the market 
timing ability of managers, this paper focuses on both the managerial actions and market reaction 
to the repurchases. I show that infrequent repurchasers strategically buy back to signal 
undervaluation and to disclose new information, which leads to positive future returns. 
2. Hypothesis development 
 
2.1. Repurchase flexibility and frequency of repurchases 
 
Prior literature suggests that repurchases are more flexible than dividends as firms are 
penalized for cutting dividends. Lintner (1956) states that the reluctance to cut dividends results in 
firms engaging in dividend smoothing. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) reinforce this 
theory with survey evidence and document that repurchases provide firms with more flexibility in 
payouts. Skinner (2008) takes the discussion forward by showing that greater flexibility motivates 
firms to substitute dividends with repurchases. The key inference from these papers is that firms 
are not obliged to repurchase regularly. However, Bargeron, Bonaimé, Feng, and Thomas (2017) 
show that repurchases may not be as flexible as previously thought, and Farre-Mensa, Michaely, 
and Schmalz (2014) suggest that flexibility does not explain the recent surge in repurchases. 
I observe that a new breed of firms that repurchase regularly (frequent repurchasers) has 
emerged. These firms have become more numerous and constitute 55% of total repurchasers in 
recent years, up from about 30% in the early 1990’s. I examine whether their emergence is driving 
the findings of studies such as Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz (2014) and Bargeron, 
Bonaimé, Feng, and Thomas (2017).  
17 
 
I use variation in repurchase frequency to explore how repurchase motives vary amongst 
repurchasers. I propose that when firms repurchase regularly, investors upwardly revise 
expectations about future repurchases. This increased expectation makes regular repurchasers 
reluctant to reduce repurchases. Lintner (1956) shows that a sticky dividend policy implies a 
reluctance to cut dividends and results in firms engaging in dividend smoothing. Extending this 
argument to repurchases, I hypothesize that firms that follow an inflexible/sticky repurchase policy 
(frequent repurchasers) are reluctant to reduce repurchases and engage in repurchase smoothing. 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) suggest that 
dividends are an ongoing commitment, while repurchases do not commit firms to future payouts. 
Thus, repurchases provide firms with financial flexibility. As a result, firms pay dividends to 
distribute permanent and stable income, and they repurchase to pay out transient and volatile 
earnings. I extend this approach to compare the flexibility of repurchases by frequent and 
infrequent repurchasers. I propose that firms that follow a flexible repurchase policy (infrequent 
repurchasers) repurchase in a traditional manner and buy back stock using temporary and volatile 
income. Meanwhile, firms that follow a rigid repurchase policy (frequent repurchasers) repurchase 
using permanent income. Therefore, frequent repurchasers are more likely to increase repurchases 
with increases in operating income, and infrequent repurchasers are more likely to increase 
repurchases with increases in non-operating income and income volatility. 
 
2.2. Signaling and frequency of repurchases 
 
A vast literature documents that signaling is a key motive for repurchases, from Comment 
and Jarrell’s (1991) early work on announcement day returns to studies of long-run performance 
(Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996). Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009) show that positive long-run returns following repurchases have persisted across 
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time. There are two aspects of signaling: undervaluation and new information disclosure. Both of 
these aspects can explain the positive returns following repurchases. Dittmar (2000) examines a 
wide array of motives for repurchases and finds that undervaluation is a consistent predictor across 
time. Vermaelen (1984) and Ofer and Thakor (1987) suggest that firms repurchase to disclose 
privately held information by managers. However, Obernberger (2014) and Fu and Huang (2015) 
show that long-term returns following repurchase announcements have disappeared during the last 
decade.  
Recent literature shows that firms’ ability to time their repurchases varies considerably 
with repurchase frequency. Dittmar and Field (2015) and Ben-Rephael, Oded, and Wohl (2013) 
find that market timing of repurchases is concentrated among infrequent repurchasers. Bonaimé, 
Kahle, Moore, and Nemani (2017) also suggest that repurchases by “frequent” firms are unlikely 
to be affected by prior returns. Consistent with these findings, I hypothesize that infrequent 
repurchasers are more likely to repurchase for signaling purposes. 
First, I focus on the undervaluation aspect of signaling. The undervaluation motive states 
that firms are more likely to repurchase when their stock is undervalued. Therefore, I predict that 
repurchase decisions of infrequent repurchasers are more strongly correlated with undervaluation 
than are those of frequent repurchasers. An examination of returns around repurchase quarters 
sheds further light on the undervaluation motive. Kahle (2002) proposes that undervaluation 
implies negative returns in the year prior to repurchases. In addition, if investors view repurchases 
as a credible signal of undervaluation, returns following repurchases should be positive. As a 
result, I hypothesize that repurchases by “infrequent” firms are preceded by negative returns and 
followed by positive returns. In comparison, frequent repurchasers realize stronger returns prior to 
repurchases and weaker returns following repurchases. 
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Next, I focus on the new information disclosure aspect of signaling. Firms with high 
information asymmetry repurchase to disclose privately held information to investors (Ofer and 
Thakor, 1987). Prior studies find that firms that are smaller, have lower institutional ownership, 
and are followed by fewer analysts have higher information asymmetry (Elliott, Morse, and 
Richardson, 1984; Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987; Bhushan, 1989). Barth and Kasznik (1999) show 
that firms with higher information asymmetry realize higher repurchase announcement returns. 
Consequently, I hypothesize that infrequent repurchasers realize higher repurchase announcement 
returns than frequent repurchasers do. 
I then examine the information content of actual repurchases. Prior literature documents 
that earnings announcement returns are positively associated with firm performance (Bartov, 
Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin, 2002), which means that the market 
reacts positively to earnings above analyst estimates and negatively to earnings below analyst 
estimates. When firms announce earnings, investors learn about both operating performance and 
repurchases during the quarter. Consequently, the differences between earnings announcement 
returns (EARs) of repurchase and non-repurchase quarters should be positively associated with the 
information content of repurchases. Therefore, I predict that infrequent repurchasers realize higher 
EARs during repurchase quarters than during non-repurchase quarters. Frequent repurchasers, 
however, should realize similar EARs during both repurchase and non-repurchase quarters. 
I then propose that the signaling effect of repurchases are more pronounced during quarters 
of weak earnings, as the market reacts more to negative news than to positive news (Skinner and 
Sloan, 2002). Therefore, firms would be more likely to repurchase for signaling purposes when 
actual earnings are below analyst estimates. This likelihood leads to the prediction that the 
20 
differences in EARs between repurchase and non-repurchase quarters are even higher for quarters 
with negative earnings surprises. 
 As a final way to gain insight about the information content of repurchases, I compare 
post-earnings announcement drifts (PEADs) for repurchase and non-repurchase quarters. Prior 
studies show that cumulative abnormal returns continue to drift upward for “good news” firms and 
down for “bad news” firms (Ball and Brown, 1968; Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin, 1984; Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989). These studies point to delayed incorporation of information from earnings 
announcements as a possible explanation for PEADs. If repurchases provide information separate 
from earnings, the drifts following repurchase and non-repurchase quarters should be different. 
When repurchases coincide with good news (strong earnings), the drifts should move further 
upwards as they provide complementary positive information. Meanwhile, when repurchases 
coincide with bad news (weak earnings), the downward drifts should be smaller as the positive 
effect of repurchases would mitigate the negative effect of weak earnings. Since I expect 
repurchase by infrequent repurchasers to be more informative than repurchases by infrequent 
repurchasers, infrequent repurchasers should realize a stronger difference in drifts between 
repurchase and non-repurchase quarters. 
2.3. Dilution and frequency of repurchases 
Kahle (2002) and Fenn and Liang (2001) show that employee compensation has a 
significant effect on the quantum of repurchases and the choice between repurchases and 
dividends. The grants and exercises of employee stock options increase the number of diluted 
(basic) shares outstanding, which in turn leads to lower diluted (basic) earnings per share. By 
repurchasing, firms can offset the increases in the shares outstanding and prevent the dilution of 
earnings per share and control. I propose that firms that repurchase for dilution need to align 
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repurchases with the grants and exercises of stock options. Dilution should therefore be a greater 
motivator for frequent repurchasers than for infrequent repurchasers. 
3. Data and key variables 
 
3.1. Data 
 
I begin with all firms in the CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1990 through 2016 
and exclude financial and utility industries (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999) and firm-years 
with missing or negative total assets. I use annual Compustat data for tests of the flexibility and 
the undervaluation motives of repurchases. My final sample consists of 161,647 firm-years. I use 
quarterly Compustat data to calculate repurchase frequency and Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) for analyst earnings estimates. I source open market repurchase announcements 
between 1990 and 2016 from Security Data Company’s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisition database. 
I exclude all announcements that lack data on Compustat or CRSP. This exclusion results in a 
sample of 15,602 announcements. To minimize the effect of outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile. 
To test the dilution hypothesis, I use data from two sources. I obtain executive options data 
from Execucomp for a sample of 39,446 firm-years over the period 1992 to 2016. However, 
Execucomp reports data for S&P 1500 firms only. Therefore, I also use total employee stock 
options data from Compustat, which covers all firms. However, this data is available from 2004 
onwards. The Compustat sample consists of 37,324 firm-years over the period 2004 to 2016. 
Following Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008), I measure repurchases as the purchase of 
common and preferred stock (prstkc) minus any reduction in the value of preferred stock 
outstanding (pstkrv). For quarterly repurchases, I first calculate quarterly purchase of common and 
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preferred stock (prstkcy for the 1st quarter and prstkcy – lag(prstkcy) for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter) 
and then subtract the reduction in preferred stock outstanding (pstkq). 
 
3.2. Key variables 
 
3.2.1. Frequent, moderate, and infrequent repurchasers 
 
The percentage of repurchasing firms that announce a repurchase plan in a year has 
declined from 59% in 1991 to 26% in 2016. Because firms have become less likely to announce 
repurchase plans, I depart from Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) and classify firms according to 
actual repurchase frequency as opposed to repurchase announcement frequency.5 In each fiscal 
year, I classify firms that repurchase during three or more quarters as “frequent” repurchasers, 
firms that repurchase during two quarters as “moderate” repurchasers, firms that repurchase during 
one quarter as “infrequent” repurchasers, and firms that do not repurchase as “no repurchases.” 
My definition is distinct from Skinner (2008), who defines firms that repurchase during 
five or more of the last ten years as “regular” repurchasers and four or fewer of the last ten years 
as “occasional” repurchasers. His definition keeps firms in the same category during a decade, 
allowing comparison of dividend and repurchase policy over time. However, my definition allows 
firms to change categories depending on their behavior in a year, which allows for analysis of 
within firm variation in repurchase motives with changes in repurchase frequency.  
My approach is similar to Dittmar and Field (2015), who use monthly repurchase data to 
classify firms that repurchase in at least nine months per year as “frequent” repurchasers, five to 
eight months per year as “moderate” repurchasers, and one to four months per year as “infrequent” 
                                                 
5 Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) classify firms that announce repurchases for the first time in the last five years as 
“infrequent” repurchasers, two times in the last five years as “occasional” repurchasers, and three or more times in the 
last five years as “frequent” repurchasers. As announcements have become less common, most firms would now be 
classified as infrequent as per their definition. Only 11% of the firms defined as frequent repurchasers by my definition 
would be classified as frequent by theirs. 
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repurchasers. My definition, which uses quarterly Compustat data, enables study over a longer 
period because firms started reporting monthly repurchases in 2004. In addition, my approach 
allows better association between repurchase frequency and firm characteristics, as Compustat 
data is available at a quarterly frequency. 
If infrequent repurchasers exhibit seasonality (i.e., they buy back stock in the same quarter 
every year), then my argument that infrequent repurchases are unexpected is weakened. However, 
I find that only 33.3% of infrequent repurchasers repurchase in the same fiscal quarter for two 
consecutive years, and only 17.5% for three consecutive years. As infrequent repurchasers buy 
back in different quarters in different years, seasonality is less likely to affect my results.6 
 
3.2.2. Undervaluation index 
 
I create an undervaluation index (U-index) which is positively associated with 
undervaluation. As in Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), the U-index is based on size (measured by 
market value of equity in 2016 dollars), book-to-market ratio, and prior six month returns. These 
three variables are associated with undervaluation and can predict higher future returns. I calculate 
U-index as the sum of quintile ranks of size (smallest: 5, largest: 1), past returns (lowest: 5, highest: 
1), and book-to-market ratio (highest: 5, lowest: 1). Thus, the index can take a minimum value of 
three and a maximum value of 15. I further define firms with U-index > 10 as undervalued and U-
index < 6 as unlikely to be undervalued (more likely to be overvalued).  
I exclude Peyer and Vermaelen’s (2009) fourth measure, “purpose of repurchase 
announcements,” since my analysis focuses on actual repurchases. Further, I determine quintile 
ranks using all firm-years, rather than determining ranks every year. My approach allows 
                                                 
6 Table OA1 details the likelihood of a firm repurchasing in the same fiscal quarter in two consecutive years. 
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comparison of undervaluation across time by allowing more firms to be undervalued during years 
in which the market as a whole is underperforming. 
4. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table I presents the summary statistics for firms in my sample. Based on their activity 
during the year, I divide all firm-years into two broad categories: repurchasers and non-
repurchasers. I further divide repurchasers into infrequent, moderate, and frequent repurchasers 
and divide non-repurchasers into firm-years with zero and positive dividends. Summary statistics 
reveal that compared to infrequent repurchasers, frequent repurchasers are almost double in size, 
have higher and more stable operating income, pay more to shareholders, have higher profitability, 
and invest less. Thus, frequent repurchasers are large, mature firms with stable income – 
characteristics usually associated with dividend payers. 
Figure 1 shows that the fraction of repurchasers that repurchase infrequently has declined 
from 43% in 1991 to 21% in 2016. During the same period, the fraction of repurchasers that buy 
back frequently has increased from 27% to 55%. Further, Figure 2 indicates that the surge in 
repurchases between 2003 and 2007 coincides with the growth in frequent repurchasers. Thus, the 
growth in repurchases may be driven by firms that repurchase frequently. 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1. Determinants and persistence of repurchase frequency 
 
Table II estimates an ordered logit model to predict repurchase frequency based on the 
prior year’s frequency and firm characteristics. Model 1 shows that for a one standard deviation 
increase in operating income, log(age), and log(market capitalization), the odds of a firm 
repurchasing more frequently increase to 2.0, 1.3, and 1.2, respectively. In contrast, for a one 
standard deviation increase in operating income volatility, capital expenditure, and leverage, the 
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odds of a firm repurchasing more frequently reduce to 0.89, 0.85, and 0.80, respectively. Thus, 
firms with high operating income, low income-volatility, large size, and high profitability are more 
likely to repurchase frequently. These results are consistent with the assertion that frequent 
repurchasers have characteristics similar to traditional dividend payers.  
Model 2 includes the prior year’s frequency along with firm characteristics. Inclusion of 
the prior year’s frequency increases the explanatory power of the model significantly: The pseudo 
R-squared increases from 0.07 to 0.22. Further, the coefficient of prior frequency is positive and 
significant, which implies that repurchase frequency is a persistent characteristic. The odds of 
repurchasing frequently next year are 2.3 times greater for frequent repurchasers than firms 
repurchasing moderately or infrequently. To control for time invariant industry characteristics, I 
include Fama-French 48 industry dummies and year dummies in model 3. Model 4 includes 
industry-year dummies to control for time varying industry shocks. Model 5 excludes recessionary 
years (2002, 2003, and 2009) to verify that the results are not driven by firms reducing repurchases 
during recessions. In model 6, I estimate a logit model, with the dependent variable equaling one 
for frequent repurchasers and zero otherwise, and include firm and year dummies. My conclusions 
remain unchanged with firm fixed effects. Thus, I provide a stronger evidence for repurchase 
persistence as my results are not driven by time invariant firm characteristics. Further, I show that 
the results hold in the cross-section as well as within firm. 
 
5.2. Repurchase flexibility and frequency of repurchases 
 
5.2.1. Repurchase smoothing 
 
Firms are reluctant to cut dividends because investors penalize them for doing so (Lintner, 
1956; Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). As a result, they adopt a stickier dividend 
policy by increasing dividends only when permanent income increases and by smoothing dividend 
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increases over several years. Extending these arguments, an inflexible repurchase policy translates 
into firms being less likely to reduce repurchases and taking more time to adjust repurchases to 
earnings changes (i.e., a lower speed of adjustment coefficient in Lintner-model regressions). 
 Figure 3 presents the relation between changes in earnings and changes in payouts for 
frequent versus infrequent repurchasers. Panel A reports the fraction of years in which firms 
increase repurchases, conditional on earnings increases; and Panel B reports the fraction of years 
in which firms reduce repurchases, conditional on an earnings decline. I hypothesize that frequent 
repurchasers are reluctant to reduce repurchases when earnings decline, while infrequent 
repurchasers are more willing to do so, as they follow a more flexible repurchase policy. I find that 
frequent repurchasers increase repurchases in 76% of the years when earnings increase, and 
infrequent repurchasers increase repurchases in 66% of the years. However, conditional on an 
earnings decline, frequent repurchasers reduce repurchases in just 29% of the years versus 51% of 
the years for infrequent repurchasers. Thus, frequent repurchasers increase repurchases when 
earnings increase, but are reluctant to reduce repurchases even when earnings decline – a behavior 
usually associated with dividend payers. 
As a second test of flexibility, I estimate Lintner-model regressions for repurchases (Equation 
(1)) and dividends (Equation (2)), respectively. 
  
∆Repurchase
t
= β
0
 + β
1
Earnings
t
+ β
2
Repurchase
t-1
 +ut                                  (1) 
∆Dividendst=  α0 + α1Earningst+ α2Dividendst-1 +εt                                  (2) 
  
Coefficients β1 and α1 measure the relation between earnings and payouts. Coefficients β2 and 
α2 denote the speed of adjustment (i.e., the inverse of time taken to adjust payouts to earnings 
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changes). A stickier payout policy implies that firms take more time to change payouts in response 
to changes in earnings, which should be reflected in lower values of α2 and β2. 
Table III, Panels A and B report the results for repurchases and dividends, respectively. 
Models 1, 2, and 3 estimate coefficients for infrequent, moderate, and frequent repurchasers, 
respectively. All models include firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. I find that dividends are on average stickier than repurchases. The speed of adjustment 
coefficients for repurchases are higher than the coefficients for dividends for all firms, which 
implies that firms take more time to adjust dividends to earnings changes than to adjust 
repurchases. Further, the coefficients of earnings are also higher for repurchases than for 
dividends, consistent with Skinner (2008), who finds that dividend smoothing has weakened the 
association between earnings and dividends. 
Since I hypothesize that frequent repurchasers follow a stickier repurchase policy resembling 
dividends, I expect that their speed of adjustment coefficient will be lower. Consistent with this 
expectation, I find that their coefficient is 0.28 – significantly lower than 0.54 for infrequent 
repurchasers. Thus, compared to infrequent repurchasers, frequent repurchasers take more time to 
adjust repurchases to earnings changes. Conversely, the coefficient of earnings is significantly 
higher for frequent repurchasers than for infrequent repurchasers. Since coefficient of earnings is 
the product of the target payout ratio and speed of adjustment, the higher coefficient implies that 
frequent repurchasers have a higher payout ratio. This higher ratio is to be expected as frequent 
repurchasers are large and mature firms with high profitability. 
Models 4 through 6 test whether firms respond differently to increases and decreases in 
earnings. I find that infrequent repurchasers have similar speed of adjustment coefficients for 
increases and declines in earnings. Frequent repurchasers, however, respond faster to earnings 
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increases than to earnings declines. This result further supports the claims that frequent 
repurchasers are reluctant to reduce repurchases and that they take more time to adjust repurchases 
to earnings declines. 
Overall, my results show that infrequent repurchasers follow a more flexible repurchase policy 
than frequent repurchasers do. Frequent repurchasers are reluctant to cut repurchases even when 
earnings decline, and they take more time to adjust repurchases to earnings changes. Thus, 
repurchases by frequent repurchasers exhibit characteristics usually associated with dividends. 
 
5.2.2. Relation between permanence of income and payout decisions 
 
The findings of Linter (1956) and Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) lead to 
empirical predictions that firms use dividends to distribute permanent income and use repurchases 
to distribute transient income. Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) provide evidence for 
these predictions by showing that firms pay dividends to distribute operating income and use 
repurchases to pay out non-operating and volatile income. I extend this approach to test how 
repurchase flexibility varies with repurchase frequency. 
I estimate a multinomial logit model to calculate the likelihood of increasing dividends, 
increasing repurchases, or both in response to changes in operating income, non-operating income 
and income volatility. I include changes and levels of operating income, non-operating income, 
income volatility, standard firm characteristics, and year and Fama-French 48 industry dummies. 
I hypothesize that repurchases by frequent repurchasers resemble dividends. Therefore, frequent 
repurchasers would be more likely to increase repurchases with increases in operating income and 
would be less likely to increase repurchases with increases in non-operating income and income 
volatility. In contrast, infrequent repurchasers would be more likely to increase repurchases with 
increases in non-operating income and income volatility.  
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Table IV outlines the results of the multinomial logit estimation with respect to the category 
“no increase in payouts.” Models 1, 2, and 3 report the log odds of a firm increasing both dividends 
and repurchases, increasing repurchases but not dividends, and increasing dividends but not 
repurchases, respectively. I interact earnings variables with indicators for frequent, moderate, 
infrequent, and no repurchases. F-tests outline the significance of differences between frequent 
and infrequent repurchasers. The results show that frequent repurchasers are likely to increase both 
dividends and repurchases when operating income increases, but do not increase either dividends 
or repurchases when income volatility increases. In comparison, moderate and infrequent 
repurchasers are significantly less likely to increase repurchases when operating income increases, 
and are more likely to increase repurchases when income volatility increases. Thus, frequent 
repurchasers use both dividends and repurchases to distribute permanent income, while infrequent 
repurchasers use dividends to distribute permanent income and use repurchases to distribute 
volatile income. 
I include the log of market capitalization, the log of age, institutional ownership, and other 
firm characteristics to control for factors such as size, firm life-cycle, and profitability. Further, 
there is a sharp jump in the number of firms repurchasing infrequently during the recessionary 
years (2002, 2003, and 2009). Therefore, models 4 through 6 exclude these three years from the 
sample and show that the recessions are not driving the results. 
In summary, Tables III and IV support my hypothesis that frequent repurchasers follow a 
stickier repurchase policy. They are reluctant to cut repurchases, take more time to respond to 
earnings changes, and are less likely to use repurchases to distribute volatile earnings. However, 
infrequent repurchasers follow a more flexible repurchase policy. They are willing to cut 
repurchases when earnings decline, respond to earnings changes faster, and increase repurchases 
30 
 
with increases in income volatility. Thus, infrequent repurchases are consistent with a traditional 
repurchase policy, while frequent repurchases are similar to a typical dividend policy. 
 
5.3. Signaling undervaluation 
 
5.3.1. Undervaluation and repurchase decisions 
 
Firms that repurchase to signal undervaluation are more likely to repurchase after poor prior 
returns. However, lower prior returns do not capture undervaluation fully. Therefore, I follow 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) to create an undervaluation index, which is the sum of the quintile 
ranks of size, prior returns, and book-to-market ratios. The U-index can take a value between 3 
and 15. Further, I define firms to be undervalued if U-index > 10 and overvalued if U-index < 6.  
Figure 4 demonstrates that, as measured by the U-index, firms have become less likely to be 
undervalued over time. Almost 30% of the repurchasers in the United States were undervalued in 
early 1990’s; but only 13% in 2016. While cases of undervaluation increased sharply during 2000–
2003 and 2008–2009 (likely due to the dot com bubble and the financial crisis), a declining trend 
is clearly visible from 1990 to 2016. Trend analysis shows that the likelihood of undervaluation 
declines by 0.80% per year (p-value: 0.003) and the likelihood of overvaluation increases by 
0.50% per year (p-value: 0.005). 
Next, I examine whether undervaluation affects firms’ decisions to repurchase in a year. 
Table V reports the results of a logit estimation with dependent variable equal to one when firms 
repurchase and zero otherwise. I control for standard firm characteristics and include firm and year 
dummies. Model 1 interacts U-index variables with indicators for frequent, moderate, infrequent, 
and no repurchases. F-tests outline the significance of differences between frequent and infrequent 
repurchasers. I find that repurchase decisions of frequent repurchasers are not associated with 
undervaluation. However, moderate and infrequent repurchasers are more likely to repurchase 
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when undervalued. Compared to frequent repurchasers, infrequent repurchasers are 5.3% more 
likely to repurchase when undervalued and 8.5% less likely to repurchase when overvalued. 
Results are even stronger for “no repurchases” firms. Compared to frequent repurchasers, “no 
repurchases” firms are 7.1% more likely to repurchase when undervalued and 10.7% less likely to 
repurchase when overvalued. Since “no repurchases” firms are an extreme case of infrequent 
repurchasers, this result further affirms that the undervaluation motive declines with repurchase 
frequency. 
Model 2 uses Tobin’s q as an alternate measure of undervaluation (lower Tobin’s q implies 
undervaluation). I find that repurchase decisions of infrequent repurchasers are more negatively 
associated with Tobin’s q than frequent repurchasers. Overall, the results in Table V establish that 
infrequent repurchasers are more likely to be motivated by undervaluation than frequent 
repurchasers. 
 
5.3.2. Quarterly returns around repurchases: univariate analysis 
 
Next, I analyze quarterly abnormal returns around repurchases to provide additional 
evidence for the undervaluation motive. Since infrequent repurchasers are more likely to 
repurchase for undervaluation, I expect them to realize lower returns in the quarter prior to 
repurchases and higher returns in the quarter following repurchases. 
I use CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models to estimate abnormal returns. Table VI 
Panel A (Panel B) presents CAPM alphas (three-factor alphas) during the quarter before, during, 
and after repurchases for infrequent, moderate, and frequent repurchasers, respectively. Infrequent 
repurchasers realize a negative CAPM alpha of -0.68% (three-factor alpha: 0.37%) during the 
quarter prior to repurchases and a positive CAPM alpha of 2.3% (three-factor alpha: 2.2%) during 
the quarter following repurchases. Thus, consistent with undervaluation, infrequent repurchasers 
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buy back following lower returns, and investors react positively to their repurchases.7 Compared 
to infrequent repurchasers, frequent repurchasers realize 0.48% higher CAPM alpha (three-factor 
alpha: 0.47%) in the quarter prior to repurchases, consistent with undervaluation being a weaker 
motive for their repurchases. Further, frequent repurchasers realize significantly lower abnormal 
returns in the quarter following repurchases than infrequent repurchasers do (CAPM alpha is lower 
by 1.1% and three-factor alpha is lower by 0.71%).8  
To provide stronger evidence that higher future returns have been caused by repurchases, 
I divide future returns into the pre- and the post-earnings announcement periods. Since investors 
learn about repurchases from earnings announcements, higher returns should be concentrated in 
the post–earnings announcement period. Indeed, I find that infrequent repurchasers realize a 
CAPM alpha of 1.4% (three factor alpha: 1.3%) during the post–earnings announcement period, 
significantly higher than CAPM alphas of 0.67% (three-factor alpha: 0.85%) for frequent 
repurchasers. 
 
5.3.3. Quarterly returns around repurchases: multivariate analysis 
 
To ensure that the returns in the quarters following repurchases are in response to 
repurchases and not just mean reversion, I use the following specification: 
 
Alpha
t+1
= β
0
+ β
1
Repurchase ind.t+ β2 Prior returns t-1+ controls + fixed effects+ εt+1             (3) 
 
                                                 
7 In untabulated results, I find that for non-repurchase quarters, infrequent repurchasers realize CAPM alpha of 0.71% 
in the prior quarter and -0.33% in the following quarter. Thus, negative prior returns and positive future returns 
correspond to repurchase quarters only. 
8 Frequent repurchasers also realize positive returns following repurchases despite these being expected by the 
investors. This result is consistent with the findings of Bessembinder and Zhang (2015), who show that trading 
strategies that involve purchasing stocks with high probability of follow-on distributions earn significant positive 
returns. Thus, the market reacts to even those events that have a high probability of occurrence. 
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Repurchase indicator equals one for repurchase quarters and zero otherwise. For firms that 
repurchase for undervaluation, β1 should be positive. I expect β1 to decline with increases in 
repurchase frequency. 
Table VII reports the results. Panels A and B use the CAPM model and the Fama-French 
three-factor model, respectively, to measure abnormal returns. I control for prior returns to mitigate 
the concerns that mean reversion of returns are driving my results. I also control for firm 
characteristics and include firm and quarter-year fixed effects to mitigate the effect of time 
invariant firm characteristics on my results. Models 1, 2, and 3 estimate the coefficients separately 
for infrequent, moderate, and frequent repurchasers. Model 1 shows that repurchases by infrequent 
firms are associated with a 2.4% higher CAPM alpha (three-factor alpha: 1.8%) in the next quarter. 
In comparison, repurchases by frequent firms are associated with a lower CAPM alpha of 0.90% 
(three-factor alpha: 0.60%).  
Model 4 includes all firm-quarters and interacts the repurchase indicator with indicators 
for frequent, moderate, infrequent, and no repurchases. F-tests outline the significance of 
differences between frequent and infrequent repurchasers. The results show that β1 is significantly 
higher for infrequent repurchasers than frequent repurchasers; this higher value demonstrates that 
repurchases by infrequent repurchasers are a stronger signal of undervaluation than are repurchases 
by frequent repurchasers. Further, “no repurchases” are firms that did not repurchase in any quarter 
in the prior year. Thus, their repurchases are less expected than even those of infrequent 
repurchasers and, hence, should contain stronger signaling power. Indeed, the effect is stronger for 
these firms, as their repurchases are associated with 3.1% higher CAPM alpha (three-factor alpha: 
2.4%) than frequent repurchasers. This result reaffirms my assertion that signaling power of 
repurchases is higher for less frequent repurchasers. 
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In sum, the results in Tables V through VII establish that repurchases by “infrequent” firms 
are more strongly motivated by undervaluation, compared to repurchases by “frequent” firms. 
5.4. Signaling: Disclosing private information 
In this section, I examine whether firms’ propensity to disclose new information varies with 
repurchase frequency. Ofer and Thakor (1987) suggest that high information asymmetry firms 
repurchase to disclose privately held information by managers. Tables I and II show that infrequent 
repurchasers exhibit characteristics associated with high information asymmetry firms: They are 
smaller, have lower institutional ownership, and are followed by fewer analysts (Elliott, Morse, 
and Richardson, 1984; Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987; Bhushan, 1989). Therefore, infrequent 
repurchasers would be more likely to use repurchases to disclose privately held information and 
reduce the information gap between managers and investors. 
5.4.1. Repurchase announcement returns 
If infrequent repurchasers are more likely to disclose new information through repurchases, 
investors should react more positively to their repurchase announcements. Table VIII outlines five-
day cumulative abnormal returns around all open market repurchase announcements between 1990 
and 2016. The announcement returns for infrequent repurchasers are significantly higher than 
frequent repurchasers, which implies that repurchase announcements by “infrequent” firms are on 
average more informative. 
5.4.2. Earnings announcement returns: repurchase versus non-repurchase quarters 
Next, I analyze earnings announcement returns for frequent and infrequent repurchasers. 
When firms announce quarterly earnings, investors learn about both operating performance and 
repurchases. Therefore, if repurchases convey incremental information, earnings announcement 
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returns should be systematically different for repurchase and non-repurchase quarters. I use 
Compustat quarterly data to obtain earnings announcement dates for each firm-quarter in my 
sample. Table IX details five-day cumulative abnormal returns around quarterly earnings 
announcements (EARs). Fama and French (2000) show that the past performance patterns may 
affect future performance. To ensure that my results are not driven by past performance, I follow 
Lie (2005) and adjust EARs with the EARs of the closest size firm in the same SIC two-digit 
industry. Panels A and B present unadjusted and adjusted EARs, respectively.  
I find that infrequent repurchasers realize EARs of 0.36% (adjusted: -0.02%) during non-
repurchase quarters. In comparison, they realize significantly higher EARs of 0.71% (adjusted: 
0.40%), when they repurchase. Meanwhile, frequent repurchasers realize statistically similar 
EARs for repurchase and non-repurchase quarters. Thus, repurchases by only infrequent firms 
provide incremental information to investors, which is distinct from the operating information 
contained in the earnings announcements.  
Next, I analyze EARs separately for quarters with positive and negative earnings surprises. 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that the stock market reacts more to negative news than to positive 
news. Therefore, firms would be more likely to repurchase for signaling when actual earnings are 
below analyst estimates, as repurchases can mitigate the negative market reaction to weak 
earnings. For negative earnings surprises, infrequent repurchasers realize incremental EARs of 
0.40% (adjusted: 0.44%) in repurchase quarters, which is significantly higher than the incremental 
returns of 0.17% (adjusted: 0.32%) for positive earnings surprises. Thus, the market reacts more 
to repurchases that coincide with negative earnings surprises. Meanwhile, frequent repurchasers 
realize similar EARs during repurchase and non-repurchase quarters irrespective of earnings 
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surprises. These results show that repurchases by infrequent repurchasers are more informative 
than repurchases by frequent repurchasers. 
To ensure that the differences in earnings announcement returns reflect the information 
content of repurchases, I regress earnings announcement returns on a repurchase indicator and 
control for earnings surprises. The model also controls for standard firm characteristics and 
includes firm and quarter-year fixed effects. Table X reports the results. Models 1, 2, and 3 estimate 
the coefficients separately for infrequent, moderate, and frequent repurchasers. Consistent with the 
prior studies (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin, 2002), earnings 
surprises are positively associated with earnings announcement returns for all firms. Further, 
infrequent repurchasers realize 0.30% higher EARs in repurchase quarters, while repurchases by 
frequent firms are not significantly associated with EARs.  
Model 4 includes all firm-quarters and interacts the repurchase indicator with indicators 
for frequent, moderate, infrequent, and no repurchases. F-tests outline the significance of 
differences between frequent and infrequent repurchasers. The results confirm that the repurchase 
coefficient is significantly higher for infrequent repurchasers than for frequent repurchasers. In 
addition, the coefficient is positive and significant for “no repurchase” firms as well, consistent 
with the assertion that less frequent repurchases are more informative.   
 
5.4.3. Post-earnings announcement drifts: repurchase versus non-repurchase quarters 
 
 Prior studies use PEADs as a sign of slow incorporation of information contained in 
earnings announcements. These studies state that the cumulative abnormal returns continue to drift 
up for “good news” firms and down for “bad news” firms (Ball and Brown, 1968; Foster, Olsen, 
and Shevlin, 1984; Bernard and Thomas, 1989). I use earnings surprise — the difference between 
actual earnings and the analyst estimates — as a proxy for news from earnings announcements. 
37 
 
The positive earnings surprises proxy for good news and the negative earnings surprises proxy for 
bad news. I compare PEADs following repurchase and non-repurchase quarters to separate the 
information content of repurchases. Figure 5a and 5b use the market model and the three-factor 
model to estimate abnormal returns. I chart PEADs separately for frequent and infrequent 
repurchasers, conditional on repurchases and good/bad news to isolate the information contained 
in repurchases. Consistent with a complementary positive effect of repurchases, cumulative 
abnormal returns exhibit a significantly greater upward drift when repurchases coincide with 
positive earnings surprises. However, the drifts following repurchases are significantly higher for 
infrequent repurchasers: In repurchase quarters they realize incremental CAPM abnormal returns 
of 2.6% (three factor model: 2.3%) over 90 trading-days versus 0.31% (three factor model: 0.50%) 
for frequent repurchasers (p-value of difference: 0.001). 
The PEAD literature documents that the cumulative returns drift downwards following bad 
news. Consistent with a downward drift after negative news, both frequent and infrequent 
repurchasers realize negative CARs for up to 60 trading days, when repurchases do not coincide 
with negative earnings surprises. When repurchases coincide with negative earnings surprises, 
though the market initially reacts negatively to the announcements of weak earnings, cumulative 
abnormal returns turn positive by the 10th trading day for infrequent repurchasers and by the 22nd 
trading day for frequent repurchasers. Further, for repurchase quarters, infrequent repurchasers 
realize incremental abnormal returns of 4.2% (three factor model: 2.9%) over 90 trading days 
following earnings announcements. The effect is significantly weaker for frequent repurchasers as 
they realize an incremental drift of just 1.7% (three factor model: 1.4%) in the repurchase quarters. 
Thus, repurchases by infrequent repurchasers convey more information than repurchases by 
frequent repurchasers do. 
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Overall, my results show that infrequent repurchasers are more likely to repurchase to 
signal undervaluation and convey new information, both of which lead to higher future returns. 
5.5. Equity compensation (dilution motive) and repurchases  
 
In this section, I examine the variation in dilution motive with repurchase frequency. I 
hypothesize that frequent repurchasers are more likely to repurchase to control dilution. To test 
this hypothesis, I follow Kahle (2002) and regress repurchases on various stock option variables 
and control for standard firm characteristics.  
Table XI, Panel A regresses repurchases on executive options outstanding and executive 
options granted. Since Execucomp covers S&P 1500 firms and reports data from 1992 onwards, 
this analysis spans the period 1992 to 2016 and includes 39,446 firm-years. I interact option 
variables with indicators for frequent, moderate, infrequent, and no repurchases. F-tests outline the 
significance of differences between frequent and infrequent repurchasers. Since repurchases are 
measured as a fraction of lagged market capitalization, the dependent variable is restricted between 
zero and one. Consequently, I use both Tobit and OLS regressions to estimate the coefficients. I 
first report the Tobit results. To control for time invariant industry characteristics, model 1 includes 
industry and year dummies. While the coefficients of executive options outstanding is positive and 
significant for both infrequent and frequent repurchasers, the F-tests show that the coefficient is 
significantly higher for frequent repurchasers. The coefficient of executive options granted is 
positive and significant for frequent repurchasers but not for infrequent repurchasers. Thus, my 
results support dilution as a stronger motive for frequent repurchasers.9 To ensure that results are 
not driven by unobserved firm characteristics, I include firm and year dummies in model 2. I find 
                                                 
9 “No repurchase” firms have a negative coefficient for executive options outstanding. This result is not surprising 
since these are smaller firms with low profitability, and Core and Guay (2001) show that firms with cash-flow 
problems may use option-based compensation to conserve cash.    
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that for infrequent repurchasers, the coefficients of both executive options outstanding and granted 
are not significant. In contrast, for frequent repurchasers the coefficients of both executive options 
outstanding and granted are positive and significant. Thus, firm fixed effects provide support for 
dilution to be a motive for only frequent repurchasers. To control for time varying industry shocks 
that may affect repurchases as well as option compensation, I include industry-year dummies in 
model 3. The results affirm that frequent repurchasers are more likely to be motivated by dilution. 
Models 4 through 6 report similar results using OLS estimation.  
Table XI, Panel B regresses repurchases on total employee stock options outstanding, total 
options exercised, and total options granted along with controls for standard firm characteristics. I 
source total employee stock option data from Compustat which include all firms. However, this 
data is available from 2004 onwards, limiting my analysis to the period 2004 to 2016. Model 1 
includes industry and year dummies and shows that frequent repurchasers have higher coefficients 
for both total options outstanding and options exercised. The coefficients for options granted are 
insignificant for all firms, which is not surprising as most options are granted at par and may not 
be EPS dilutive. The results are similar when I include firm and year dummies (model 2) or 
industry-year dummies (model 3), and when I use OLS estimation (models 4 through 6). 
In conclusion, Table XI shows that dilution is a stronger motive for frequent repurchasers 
than for infrequent repurchasers. These results are consistent with the findings of Bonaimé, Kahle, 
Moore, and Nemani (2017) that increases in equity compensation make a firm more likely to 
repurchase frequently. However, this conclusion will be flawed if infrequent repurchasers do not 
use equity incentives to compensate employees. To mitigate these concerns, I compare option 
compensation for frequent and infrequent repurchasers. I find that frequent and infrequent 
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repurchasers have similar levels of total options outstanding; and, contrary to the concerns, 
infrequent repurchasers have even higher executive options outstanding and granted. 10 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper shows that the distinction between dividends and repurchases is narrowing for 
a large number of firms that repurchase frequently. When firms repurchase frequently, investors 
expect them to continue repurchasing. In turn they adopt a conservative repurchase policy, and 
their repurchases start to resemble dividends. Meanwhile, infrequent repurchasers follow a 
relatively flexible repurchase policy and quickly respond to earnings changes. In addition, 
infrequent repurchasers have higher information asymmetry compared to frequent repurchasers. 
They disclose privately held information through repurchases to reduce the information gap 
between managers and investors. Frequent repurchasers, on the other hand, are more likely to 
repurchase to offset dilution caused by equity compensation. 
Finally, the increasing proportion of firms that repurchase frequently can explain the recent 
findings that repurchases have become less flexible and are less motivated by signaling in recent 
years. Further, Bonaimé, Kahle, Moore, and Nemani (2017) find that the dilution motive has 
become stronger over time. This finding is also consistent with the increase in the number of 
frequent repurchasers whose repurchases are motivated more by dilution. 
  
                                                 
10 Please see Table OA3 for detailed results. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Compustat (Annual) 
Repurchases: The expenditure on the repurchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC) 
minus any reduction in the value of preferred stock outstanding (PSTKRV). 
Market capitalization: Shares outstanding (CSHO) times stock price (PRCC_F) at the end of the 
prior year. 
Market-to-book: Market capitalization plus long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities 
(DLC) plus preferred stock (PSTK), divided by the book value of assets (AT), at the end of the 
prior year. 
Leverage: Sum of long-term debt (DLTT) and short-term debt (DLC), divided by book value of 
assets (AT), at the end of the prior year. 
CAPEX: Capital expenditures (CAPX), divided by total assets (AT), at the end of the prior year. 
Dividends: Total common stock dividend (DVC), divided by market capitalization. 
Return on assets: Net income (NI) divided by total assets (AT), at the end of prior year. 
Operating income: Operating income (OIBDP), divided by total assets (AT), at the end of prior 
year. 
Non-operating income: Non-operating income (NOPI), divided by total assets (AT), at the end 
of prior year. 
Variability of operating income: Standard deviation of operating income during the last five 
years. 
Repurchase increase: Increase in repurchases/total assets (AT) over last year. 
Earnings per share increase: Increase in earnings per share (EPSPX) over last year, adjusted for 
stock splits and stock dividends (ADJEX_F). 
Total options exercised: Total number of stock options exercised (OPTEXD) by all employees 
in the prior year, as a fraction of shares outstanding. 
Total options granted: Total number of stock options granted (OPTGR) to all employees in the 
current year, as a fraction of shares outstanding.  
Total options outstanding: Total number of stock options outstanding (OPTOSBY) for all 
employees at the end of the prior year, as a fraction of shares outstanding. 
Compustat (Quarterly) 
Repurchase: The expenditure on the repurchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKCY for 
the first fiscal quarter and PRSTKCY – lag(PRSTKCY) for the second, the third, and the fourth 
fiscal quarters) minus any reduction in the value of preferred stock outstanding (PSTKQ). 
Infrequent repurchaser: If a firm repurchases during only one quarter in a year. 
Moderate repurchaser: If a firm repurchases during two quarters in a year. 
Frequent repurchaser: If a firm repurchases during three or more quarters in a year. 
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No repurchases: if a firm does not repurchase in a year. 
Repurchase indicator: An indicator variable equal to one if the firm repurchases during a quarter. 
Execucomp 
Executive options granted: Number of stock options granted to the top five executives in the 
current year, as a fraction of shares outstanding. 
Executive options outstanding: Number of stock options outstanding for the top five executives 
at the end of the prior year, as a fraction of shares outstanding. 
CRSP 
Dividend increase: Increase in regular dividends per share (DIVAMT) over last year. I include 
distribution codes (DISTCD) 1232, 1242, 1233, 1234, and 1235 to calculate regular dividends. I 
observe that in 483 cases, CRSP reports five dividends in one year and three dividends in the prior 
or the following year. In all such cases, I ensure that firms have four dividends per year by either 
moving the first dividend to the prior year or the last dividend to the later year. 
Prior one-year return: Buy and hold return over the prior year. 
Repurchase announcement return: Cumulative abnormal returns during the 5-day window 
around repurchase announcements using market model, where equal-weighted index is used to 
proxy for the overall market returns, and the estimation period spans from 250 to 10 days prior to 
the repurchase announcements. 
Earnings announcement return: Cumulative abnormal returns during the 5-day window around 
quarterly earnings announcement using market model, where equal-weighted index is used to 
proxy for the overall market returns and the estimation period spans from 250 to 10 days prior to 
the earnings announcements. 
Institutional ownership: Shares held by institutional investors as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding. This measurement is the sum of stakes held by all institutional investors as reported 
in their quarterly 13(f) reports. The data were purchased from Thomson Financial. All institutions 
with at least $100 million under management are required to report equity positions (greater than 
10,000 shares or $200,000) to the SEC each quarter. Managers with stale reports (i.e., report date 
unequal to quarter-end date) are excluded for the quarter. The data are also cleaned of obvious 
reporting errors (e.g., lags in adjustment for stock splits). 
Age: Years since the firm appears for the first time in CRSP database. 
IBES 
Number of analysts: Maximum number of EPS estimates available in IBES during the past one 
year. 
Earnings surprise: Percentage difference in actual earnings per share (ACTUAL) and median 
analyst estimates (MEDEST). 
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Figure 1 
Trends in repurchase frequency 
This figure charts the percentage of repurchasers that repurchase frequently (during three or four quarters in a year) 
and that repurchase infrequently (during one quarter in a year), from 1990 through 2016.  
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Figure 2 
Trends in repurchasing firms 
This figure shows the fraction of firms that repurchase in a year for the full sample of listed CRSP/Compustat firms 
from 1990 to 2016. Repurchases are measured as purchase of common and preferred stock minus any reduction in the 
value of preferred stock outstanding. 
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Figure 3 
Propensity to change repurchases with changes in earnings 
This figure shows the propensity of frequent and infrequent repurchasers to increase (decrease) repurchases with increases (declines) in earnings. Panel A reports 
the number of years during which firms increase repurchases (versus prior year) as a percentage of total number of years with earnings increases. Panel B reports 
the number of years during which firms reduce repurchases (versus prior year) as a percentage of total number of years with earnings decline. 
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Figure 4 
Trend in undervaluation index 
This figure plots the percentage of repurchasing firms with an undervaluation index (U-index) < 6 and undervaluation 
index > 10. The U-index, which is the sum of the quintile ranks of size (5: smallest, 1: largest), book-to-market (5: 
largest, 1: smallest), and prior year returns (5: lowest, 1: highest), takes a higher value for firms that are more likely 
to be undervalued. 
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Figure 5a 
PEAD for frequent and infrequent repurchasers (Mkt model) 
This figure plots cumulative abnormal returns (using market model) following earnings announcements. Panel A presents the CARs for infrequent repurchasers 
and Panel B for frequent repurchasers. The chart separates CARs into four categories. The first category consists of quarters in which firms do not repurchase and 
do report earnings below analyst estimates. The second category includes quarters without repurchases and with actual earnings higher than the analyst estimates. 
The third and fourth categories comprise quarters with repurchases and actual earnings below and above analyst estimates, respectively. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Figure 5b 
PEAD for frequent and infrequent repurchasers (Fama-French three-factor model) 
This figure plots cumulative abnormal returns (using three-factor model) following earnings announcements. Panel A presents the CARs for infrequent repurchasers 
and Panel B for frequent repurchasers. The chart separates CARs into four categories. The first category consists of quarters in which firms do not repurchase and 
do report earnings below analyst estimates. The second category includes quarters without repurchases and actual earnings higher than the analyst estimates. The 
third and fourth categories comprise quarters with repurchases and actual earnings below and above analyst estimates, respectively. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table I  
Summary statistics 
This table exhibits summary statistics for my sample of 161,647 firm-years between 1990 and 2016. I divide firm-years into two broad categories, repurchases = 0 
and repurchases > 0. Furthermore, years with zero repurchases are divided into years with zero dividends and dividend > 0. Repurchasers are divided into three 
categories: infrequent repurchasers (years in which firms repurchase during one quarter only), moderate repurchasers (years in which firms repurchase during two 
quarters), and frequent repurchasers (years in which firms repurchase during three or more quarters). Repurchases and dividends are expressed as a percentage of 
market capitalization; and operating income, non-operating income, capex, and leverage are expressed as a percentage of total assets. Return on assets and 
institutional ownership are in percentages. The last two columns present the differences between frequent and infrequent repurchasers, and between infrequent 
repurchasers and dividend payers; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Please refer to the appendices for detailed variable 
definitions. 
 
  Repurchase = 0   Repurchases >0   Frequent - 
infrequent 
Infrequent -
dividend >0   Dividend =0 Dividend>0   Infrequent Moderate Frequent   
Assets (2016 $ million) 1,186 8,969   4,944 5,691 9,768   4824*** -4025*** 
Operating income -3.5 10.09   7.61 9.61 13.01   5.41*** -2.48*** 
Non-operating income 0.93 0.42   0.71 0.68 0.62   -0.10*** 0.29*** 
Operating income volatility 10.14 2.91   5.42 4.62 3.78   -1.63*** 2.51*** 
Return on assets -13.66 3.54   -1.29 1.10 4.69   5.98*** -4.83*** 
Capital expenditure 5.64 4.09   5.07 4.62 4.29   -0.78*** 0.98*** 
Leverage 15.82 18.78   22.93 20.98 19.67   -3.26*** 4.15*** 
Market-to-book 2.02 1.14   1.40 1.36 1.49   0.10*** 0.26*** 
Repurchases - -   1.60 2.93 4.93   3.33*** 1.60*** 
Dividends - 3.63   1.40 1.48 1.50   0.10*** -2.23*** 
Dividends >0  - 100.00   43.47 49.76 59.81   16.33*** -56.53*** 
Age 8.87 16.60   14.90 17.06 20.60   5.70*** -1.70*** 
Institutional ownership 31.4 40.60   45.00 49.73 55.08   10.08*** 4.40*** 
Prior one-year return 13.93 14.47   11.92 12.90 15.49   3.57*** -2.55*** 
Number of analysts 5.5 6.07   7.09 8.02 10.27   3.18*** 1.02 
Number of observations 74,161 38,112   16,833 13,567 18,974       
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Table II 
Ordered logit and logit estimation of repurchase frequency 
Models 1 through 5 present the results of an ordered logit model with dependent variable equaling 0 for years with no 
repurchases, 1 for infrequent repurchasers, 2 for moderate repurchasers, and 3 for frequent repurchasers. First two 
models include year dummies and the third model includes industry (Fama-French 48 industries) and year dummies. 
Models 4 and 5 include industry-year dummies. The fifth model excludes recessionary years (2002, 2003, and 2009). 
Model 6 uses logit estimation with dependent variable as one for frequent repurchasers and zero otherwise. It includes 
firm and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by firm. All independent variables are defined in the appendices. 
T-statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Prior frequency  0.817*** 0.797*** 0.796*** 0.796*** 0.716*** 
 
 (125.73) (121.50) (115.43) (111.44) (29.94) 
Operating income 3.085*** 1.702*** 1.384*** 1.360*** 1.396*** 2.103*** 
 
(19.93) (15.27) (12.06) (11.64) (10.61) (8.83) 
Non-operating income 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.36) (-0.66) (-0.84) (-0.99) (-1.13) (-0.46) 
Income Volatility -1.198*** -0.625*** -0.743*** -0.658*** -0.607*** -0.910*** 
  (-6.17) (-4.78) (-5.29) (-4.59) (-4.03) (-2.73) 
Log (Mkt cap) 0.100*** 0.080*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.120*** 0.522*** 
 
(10.24) (13.62) (17.21) (17.24) (17.51) (23.29) 
Market-to-book -0.045*** -0.021*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.043*** -0.236*** 
 
(-3.62) (-2.62) (-4.52) (-4.21) (-4.75) (-14.03) 
Capital expenditure -2.486*** -1.555*** -1.156*** -1.418*** -1.398*** -2.303*** 
 
(-10.22) (-9.38) (-6.58) (-7.66) (-7.27) (-6.42) 
Leverage -0.993*** -0.696*** -0.650*** -0.649*** -0.651*** -1.900*** 
 
(-14.21) (-15.34) (-13.58) (-12.61) (-12.24) (-16.24) 
Return on assets 0.260** 0.254*** 0.367*** 0.371*** 0.431*** 0.825*** 
 
(2.48) (2.75) (3.95) (3.98) (3.68) (4.33) 
Prior one-year return -0.207*** -0.019 -0.014 -0.020 -0.038** -0.160*** 
 
(-13.08) (-1.22) (-0.89) (-1.23) (-2.18) (-5.76) 
Log(age) 0.185*** 0.056*** 0.078*** 0.085*** 0.090*** 0.220*** 
 (10.76) (5.28) (7.03) (7.41) (7.53) (6.01) 
Institutional ownership 0.702*** 0.386*** 0.245*** 0.316*** 0.310*** -0.696*** 
 (12.43) (10.73) (6.44) (7.90) (7.40) (-7.36) 
Number of observations 116,107 116,107 116,107 116,107 101,876 62,911 
Fixed effects Year Year FF 48/Year FF48-Year FF48-Year Firm/Year 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.075 0.223 0.228 0.245 0.247 0.109 
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Table III 
Lintner model regressions for timeliness of changes in payouts with changes in earnings 
This table reports Lintner model regressions for repurchases (Panel A) and dividends (Panel B). Models 1, 2, and 3 
report the estimates for infrequent, moderate, and frequent repurchasers, respectively. I define firms as 
frequent/moderate/infrequent based on the repurchase activities in the prior year. Repurchases are defined in section 
3.1 and are standardized by total assets (AT); dividends are regular dividends per share from CRSP and earnings per 
share (EPSPX) and total earnings (EPSPX*CSHO, standardized by total assets) are from Compustat. Models 4 
through 6 include interactions of dependent variables with an indicator variable that equals one if increases in earnings 
are in the top tercile. All models include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics 
are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Linter model regression for repurchases 
  Infrequent Moderate Frequent   Infrequent Moderate Frequent 
Total earnings 0.024*** 0.041*** 0.057***  0.015*** 0.025*** 0.026** 
 (5.67) (6.43) (4.49)  (4.27) (4.85) (2.41) 
Total earnings * earnings 
increase. 
    0.004 0.004 0.092*** 
     (0.84) (0.47) (4.63) 
Repurchases (Lag) -0.542*** -0.447*** -0.280***  -0.521*** -0.484*** -0.269*** 
 (-4.33) (-10.05) (-2.71)  (-3.05) (-11.88) (-2.85) 
Repurchases (Lag) * 
earnings increase 
    -0.026 0.104 -0.107*** 
     (-0.24) (1.34) (-2.88) 
Earnings increase 
indicator 
    -0.000 -0.003 0.005* 
     (-0.16) (-1.12) (1.89) 
Number of observations 13,968 10,944 15,233   13,968 10,944 15,233 
Adjusted R-squared 0.197 0.304 0.187   0.197 0.307 0.202 
 
Panel B: Linter model regression for dividends 
  Infrequent Moderate Frequent   Infrequent Moderate Frequent 
Earnings per share 0.011*** 0.001*** 0.010*  0.011*** 0.001*** 0.010 
 (3.70) (3.03) (1.69)  (3.49) (3.00) (1.35) 
Earnings per share * 
earnings increase 
    -0.000 -0.000 0.002 
     (-0.67) (-0.17) (1.00) 
Dividends (Lag) -0.143*** -0.147*** -0.040***  -0.151*** -0.147*** -0.046*** 
 (-8.51) (-9.09) (-2.78)  (-8.67) (-8.35) (-3.15) 
Dividends (Lag)*earnings 
increase 
    0.022 0.000 0.013 
     (1.21) (0.01) (1.48) 
Earnings increase indicator     -0.008* 0.002 -0.002 
     (-1.92) (0.51) (-0.43) 
Number of observations 13,441 10,627 14,865   13,441 10,627 14,865 
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.124 0.054   0.115 0.124 0.057 
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Table IV 
Permanence of earnings and payout decisions 
This table estimates multinomial logit regression to examine the effect of changes in operating income, non-operating 
income, and income volatility on firms’ payout decisions. The dependent variable has four categories: (i) years with 
increase in both dividends and repurchases, (ii) years with increase in only repurchases, (iii) years with increase in 
only dividends, and (iv) years with no increase in payout (the base category). Models1 through 3 include all firm-
years across 1990 to 2016. Models 4 through 6 exclude recessionary periods (2002, 2003, and 2009). I define firms 
as frequent/moderate/infrequent/no repurchases based on the repurchase activities in the prior year. All regressions 
include dummies for infrequent, moderate, and no repurchases and control for levels and changes of log(market cap), 
return on assets, market-to-book, capex, leverage, institutional ownership, log(age), and prior returns. Regressions 
also include Fama-French 48 industry and year dummies, and standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in 
parentheses and p-values are in brackets; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Base category: No payout increase  Base category: No payout increase 
 Both 
increase 
Repurchase 
increase 
Dividend 
increase 
 Both 
increase 
Repurchase 
increase 
Dividend 
increase 
∆Operating income*frequent 10.662*** 4.493*** 2.909***  10.948*** 4.616*** 3.004*** 
 (15.97) (11.32) (5.02)  (15.24) (9.86) (4.71) 
∆Operating income*moderate 6.380*** 2.023*** 3.221***  6.506*** 1.066*** 3.511*** 
 (10.22) (5.36) (4.12)  (9.80) (4.92) (3.97) 
∆Operating income*infrequent 3.861*** 0.314* 1.342*  3.803*** 0.571* 1.705** 
 (6.40) (1.87) (1.87)  (6.04) (1.83) (2.16) 
∆Operating income*no repurchases 3.227*** 0.325** 2.488***  3.195*** 0.229 2.517*** 
 (7.73) (1.99) (7.18)  (7.57) (1.32) (6.85) 
∆Income volatility*frequent -8.567*** -2.625*** -4.708**  -8.103*** -2.110*** -4.400** 
 (-4.53) (-4.32) (-2.47)  (-3.93) (-3.42) (-2.09) 
∆Income volatility*moderate -8.176*** 0.812** -3.211  -8.578*** 0.555 -4.308* 
 (-4.42) (2.10) (-1.44)  (-4.54) (1.40) (-1.83) 
∆Income volatility*infrequent -8.902*** 0.815** -3.120*  -9.010*** 0.672* -3.524* 
 (-4.01) (2.12) (-1.75)  (-3.93) (1.77) (-1.86) 
∆Income volatility*no repurchases -6.447*** 1.375** -4.235***  -6.711*** 1.410** -4.426*** 
 (-5.34) (2.24) (-4.98)  (-5.45) (2.07) (-4.81) 
∆Non-operating income*frequent 5.653*** 3.904*** 4.312***  5.672** 4.198*** 4.905*** 
 (2.94) (3.97) (3.02)  (2.48) (3.43) (2.63) 
∆Non-operating income*moderate 1.889 3.054*** 5.853***  2.081 3.793*** 6.112*** 
 (0.65) (3.14) (2.92)  (0.67) (2.78) (3.13) 
∆Non-operating income*infrequent 6.396*** 3.482** 4.327  6.563*** 3.725** 4.960* 
 (2.60) (2.32) (1.62)  (2.89) (2.15) (1.86) 
∆Non-operating income*no repurchases 2.231 3.127*** 1.166  2.767* 3.265*** 1.101 
 (1.53) (4.23) (1.11)  (1.80) (4.08) (0.98) 
F-tests with p-values               
∆Operating income (freq-infreq) 6.801*** 4.179*** 1.568*  7.144*** 4.045*** 1.299 
P-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.075]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.185] 
∆Income volatility (freq-infreq) 0.335 -3.440*** -1.588  0.907 -2.782** -0.876 
P-value [0.904] [0.008] [0.523]  [0.553] [0.029] [0.344] 
∆Non-operating income (freq-infreq) -0.743 0.422 -0.015  -0.892 0.473 -0.055 
P-value [0.897] [0.597] [0.952]  [0.781] [0.497] [0.733] 
Number of observations 96,337   84,433 
Industry/year fixed effects/controls Yes  Yes 
Period 1990-2016  Excludes 2002, 2003, 2009 
Pseudo R-squared 0.196   0.197 
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Table V 
Undervaluation and decision to repurchase 
This table reports logit estimation of the effect of undervaluation index on the decision to repurchase in a year. The 
dependent variable equals one for years with positive repurchases and zero otherwise. Model 1 details the effect of 
high (U-index > 10) and low (U-index < 6) undervaluation index on repurchase decisions. Model 2 uses Tobin’s q as 
a proxy for undervaluation. I define firms as frequent/moderate/infrequent/no repurchases based on the repurchase 
activities in the prior year. All models include dummies for infrequent, moderate, and no repurchases and include 
controls for log (market capitalization), operating income, return on assets, market-to-book, capex, leverage, 
institutional ownership, log (age), and prior returns along with year and firm dummies. All independent variables are 
defined in the appendices. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in 
brackets; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
  Model 1   Model 2 
 Coefficient Marginal effects  Coefficient Marginal effects 
U-Index >10 * frequent -0.087 -0.026    
 (-1.34)     
U-Index > 10 * moderate 0.102* 0.011    
 (1.82)     
U-Index > 10 * infrequent 0.215*** 0.032   ` 
 (4.48)     
U-Index > 10 * no repurchases 0.325*** 0.049    
 (11.14)     
U-Index < 6 * frequent 0.388*** 0.066    
 (4.17)     
U-Index < 6 * moderate 0.059 0.016    
 (0.78)     
U-Index < 6 * infrequent -0.065 -0.005    
 (-1.04)     
U-Index < 6 * no repurchases -0.175*** -0.025    
 (-5.42)     
Tobin's q * frequent    -0.120*** -0.021 
    (-4.38)  
Tobin's q * moderate    -0.203*** -0.036 
    (-9.05)  
Tobin's q * infrequent    -0.200*** -0.036 
    (-10.98)  
Tobin's q * no repurchases    -0.178*** -0.032 
    (-18.38)  
F-tests with p-values           
U- index >10 (frequent-infrequent) -0.302*** -0.053    
P-value [0.001]     
U-index < 6 (frequent-infrequent) 0.453*** 0.085    
P-value [0.000]     
Tobin's q (frequent-infrequent)    0.080*** 0.015 
P-value    [0.009]  
Number of observations 99,512   99,990 
Firm/year fixed effects/controls Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R squared 0.171   0.169 
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Table VI 
Abnormal returns around repurchase quarter 
This table compares abnormal returns in the quarters before (Qt-1), during (Qt), and after repurchases (Qt+1) for all 
repurchasing firms in my sample. Lead quarter returns are further divided into the pre- and the post-earnings 
announcement period. Panels A and B calculate abnormal returns using CAPM model and Fama-French three-factor 
model respectively. I define firms as frequent/moderate/infrequent based on the repurchase activities in the prior year. 
P-values are in brackets; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: CAPM abnormal returns around repurchase quarters 
  
Qt-1 Qt 
Qt+1 
 Pre-earnings 
announcement 
Post-earnings 
announcement 
Full 
Quarter 
Infrequent -0.68 0.66 0.90 1.40 2.30 
      
Moderate -0.53 -0.29 0.65 0.91 1.56 
      
Frequent -0.20 -0.09 0.54 0.67 1.21 
      
Infrequent - Frequent -0.48** 0.75*** 0.36** 0.83*** 1.09*** 
P-value [0.049] [0.001] [0.011] [0.004] [0.000] 
 
Panel B: Fama-French three-factor abnormal returns around repurchase quarters 
  
Qt-1 Qt 
Qt+1 
 Pre-earnings 
announcement 
Post-earnings 
announcement 
Full 
Quarter 
Infrequent 0.37 1.25 0.94 1.30 2.24 
      
Moderate 0.77 0.90 0.83 0.97 1.80 
      
Frequent 1.04 1.11 0.68 0.85 1.53 
      
Infrequent - Frequent -0.47*** 0.14 0.26 0.45* 0.71** 
P-value [0.002] [0.448] [0.260] [0.089] [0.026] 
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Table VII 
Do future abnormal returns vary with repurchase frequency? 
This table reports the results of the regression of next-quarter abnormal returns on repurchases. Panel A and Panel B 
use CAPM and FAMA-French three-factor models to estimate abnormal returns. Repurchase indicator equals one for 
quarters in which firms repurchase. Models 1, 2, and 3 estimate results for infrequent, moderate, and frequent 
repurchasers, respectively. Model 4 includes all firm-quarters and interacts repurchase indicator variable with 
indicators for frequent repurchasers, moderate repurchasers, infrequent repurchasers, and no repurchases. I define 
firms as frequent/moderate/infrequent/no repurchases based on the repurchase activities in the prior year. All models 
include dummies for infrequent, moderate, and no repurchases and include controls for log(market capitalization), 
operating income, return on assets, market-to-book, capex, leverage, institutional ownership, log(age), and prior 
quarter alpha, along with firm and quarter-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in 
parentheses and p-values are in brackets; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
  
Panel A: Effect of repurchases on future CAPM alpha 
  CAPM alpha in Quarter t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Infrequent Moderate Frequent All firms 
Repurchase indicator 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.009***  
 (6.88) (4.59) (3.06)  
Repurchase Indicator * frequent    0.010*** 
    (4.04) 
Repurchase Indicator * moderate    0.021*** 
    (7.07) 
Repurchase Indicator * infrequent    0.029*** 
    (9.53) 
Repurchase Indicator * no repurchases    0.041*** 
        (17.44) 
F-tests with p-values     
Repurchase indicator (freq-infreq)    0.019*** 
p-values    [0.000] 
Number of firm-quarters 46,231 36,716 50,444 418,305 
Firm and quarter fixed effects/controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.132 0.139 0.112 0.122 
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Panel B: Effect of repurchases on future Fama-French three-factor alpha 
 
  Fama-French three-factor alpha in Quartert+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Infrequent Moderate Frequent All firms 
Repurchase indicator 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.006**  
 (5.47) (3.98) (2.11)  
Repurchase Indicator * frequent    0.012*** 
    (5.05) 
Repurchase Indicator * moderate    0.020*** 
    (6.88) 
Repurchase Indicator * infrequent    0.024*** 
    (7.99) 
Repurchase Indicator * no repurchases    0.035*** 
       (15.54) 
F-tests with p-values     
Repurchase indicator (freq-infreq)    0.012*** 
p-values    [0.001] 
Number of quarters 46,231 36,716 50,444 418,298 
Firm and quarter fixed effects/controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.107 0.109 0.088 0.101 
 
 
 
 
  
  
57 
 
Table VIII 
Repurchase announcement returns for frequent vs. infrequent repurchasers 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns over five days around the announcement date for all open-market 
repurchases during the period 1990 to 2016. The abnormal returns are estimated using the market model, where equal-
weighted index is used to proxy for the overall market returns and the estimation period spans from 250 to 10 days 
prior to repurchase announcements. I define firms as frequent/moderate/infrequent/no repurchases based on the 
repurchase activities in the year just prior to the repurchase announcement date. P-values are in brackets; ***, **, and 
* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
  
No 
repurchases 
Infrequent Moderate Frequent 
Infrequent - 
Frequent 
Repurchase announcement 
returns 
2.61 2.00 1.39 1.42 0.58** 
P-value of difference     [0.028] 
      
Number of announcements 8,982 1,832 1,762 3,028  
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Table IX 
Earnings announcement returns for frequent and infrequent repurchasers 
This table reports five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR [-2, +2]) around the quarterly earnings announcement 
date for all repurchasers during the period 1990 to 2016. Panel A reports unadjusted EARs. Panel B reports EARs 
adjusted with the EARs of the closest size firms in the same SIC two-digit industry to control for prior performance. 
The abnormal returns are estimated using the market model, where equal-weighted index is used to proxy for the 
overall market returns, and the estimation period spans from 250 to 10 days prior to the earnings announcements. 
Models 1 to 3 present EARs for infrequent repurchasers and models 4 to 6 show EARs for frequent repurchasers. 
Models 2 and 3 (5 and 6) detail the returns separately for quarters with positive (actual EPS more than median analyst 
estimates from IBES) and negative (actual EPS less than median analyst estimates from IBES) earnings surprises. I 
define firms as frequent /infrequent based on the repurchase activities in the prior year. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: EARs for frequent and infrequent repurchasers 
  Infrequent repurchasers   Frequent repurchasers 
 All 
quarters 
Earnings 
surprise ≥ 0 
Earnings 
surprise < 0 
 All 
quarters 
Earnings 
surprise ≥ 0 
Earnings 
surprise < 0 
Repurchase quarter 0.71 2.01 -0.02  0.59 1.62 -0.21 
        
        
Non-repurchase quarter 0.36 1.84 -0.38  0.52 1.78 -0.23 
        
        
Repurchase - No 
repurchase 
0.35*** 0.17 0.40**  0.07 -0.16 0.02 
P-value [0.000] [0.199] [0.026]   [0.369] [0.143] [0.833] 
 
 
Panel B: Adjusted EARs for frequent and infrequent repurchasers 
  Infrequent repurchasers   Frequent repurchasers 
 All 
quarters 
Earnings 
surprise ≥ 0 
Earnings 
surprise < 0 
 All 
quarters 
Earnings 
surprise ≥ 0 
Earnings 
surprise < 0 
Repurchase quarter 0.40 1.50 -0.14  0.20 1.09 -0.52 
        
        
Non-repurchase quarter -0.02 1.18 -0.58  0.06 1.27 -0.71 
        
        
Repurchase - No 
repurchase 
0.42*** 0.32** 0.44***  0.14 -0.18 0.19 
P-value [0.005] [0.038] [0.005]   [0.135] [0.166] [0.138] 
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Table X 
Earnings announcement returns and repurchase frequency: multivariate results 
This table reports the regression of earnings announcement returns on repurchase indicator that takes a value of one 
for repurchase quarters. Models 1, 2, and 3 estimate results respectively for infrequent, moderate, and frequent 
repurchasers. Model 4 uses all firm-quarters and interacts the repurchase indicator with indicators for frequent 
repurchasers, moderate repurchasers, infrequent repurchasers, and no repurchases. I define firms as 
frequent/moderate/infrequent/no repurchases based on the repurchase activities in the prior year. Earnings surprise is 
defined as the percentage difference between actual EPS (ACTUAL) and median analyst estimates from IBES 
(MEDEST). All models include dummies for infrequent, moderate, and no repurchases and include controls for 
log(market capitalization), operating income, return on assets, market-to-book, capex, leverage, institutional 
ownership, log(age), and prior quarter returns, along with firm and quarter-year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets; ***, **, and * denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
  Earnings announcement returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Infrequent Moderate Frequent All firms 
Repurchase indicator 0.003*** 0.002* -0.000  
 (2.85) (1.94) (-0.01)  
Repurchase Indicator * frequent    -0.000 
    (-0.06) 
Repurchase Indicator * moderate    0.002* 
    (1.85) 
Repurchase Indicator * infrequent    0.002** 
    (2.39) 
Repurchase Indicator * no repurchase    0.003*** 
    (3.80) 
Earnings surprise 0.124*** 0.141*** 0.160*** 0.127*** 
 (16.95) (17.79) (22.45) (43.77) 
F-tests with p-values         
Repurchase indicator (freq-infreq)    0.003** 
p-values    [0.040] 
Number of quarters        39,875  32,757 46,930 346,232 
Firm and quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 0.043 0.045 0.022 
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Table XI 
Repurchases and option compensation 
This table presents Tobit and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of repurchases on employee stock-based 
compensation, control variables, and firm and year fixed effects. Panel A uses executive options outstanding and 
granted from Execucomp (for top five executives) over the period 1992 to 2016.  Panel B uses total options 
outstanding, exercised and granted from Compustat during the period 2004 to 2016. Models 1, 2, and 3 report Tobit 
estimation and models 4, 5, and 6 report OLS estimates.  All models include dummies for infrequent, moderate, and 
no repurchases and control for log(market capitalization), operating income, return on assets, market-to-book, capex, 
leverage, institutional ownership, log(age) and prior returns All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets; ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Repurchases and executive stock options 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Repurchase/lagged market capital 
 Tobit  OLS 
Exec options o/s * frequent 0.176*** 0.066* 0.164***  0.165*** 0.086** 0.156*** 
 (4.76) (1.73) (4.46)  (4.45) (2.45) (4.21) 
Exec options o/s * moderate 0.158*** 0.047 0.128***  0.129*** 0.052* 0.117*** 
 (4.82) (1.36) (3.90)  (3.99) (1.68) (3.59) 
Exec options o/s * infrequent 0.081*** -0.003 0.064**  0.053** -0.003 0.049** 
 (3.12) (-0.11) (2.47)  (2.29) (-0.12) (2.11) 
Exec options o/s * no repurchases -0.120*** -0.198*** -0.049  -0.009* -0.048*** -0.005 
 (-3.40) (-4.63) (-1.47)  (-1.70) (-4.35) (-0.85) 
Exec options granted * frequent 0.629*** 0.501*** 0.678***  0.585*** 0.479*** 0.614*** 
 (5.26) (4.37) (5.70)  (4.88) (4.20) (5.12) 
Exec options granted * moderate 0.410*** 0.261** 0.453***  0.360*** 0.255** 0.76*** 
 (3.58) (2.26) (3.92)  (3.16) (2.32) (3.28) 
Exec options granted * infrequent -0.043 -0.112 0.038  0.038*** -0.002 0.058*** 
 (-0.43) (-0.93) (0.39)  (3.01) (-0.10) (3.95) 
Exec options granted * no 
repurchases 
0.136 0.086 0.144  0.113 0.054 0.110 
 (1.52) (0.87) (1.64)  (1.41) (0.63) (1.36) 
F-tests with p-values               
Exec options o/s (freq-infreq) 0.095** 0.069** 0.100**  0.112*** 0.089** 0.107** 
P-value [0.024] [0.031] [0.017]  [0.007] [0.022] [0.011] 
Exec options granted (freq-infreq) 0.672*** 0.613*** 0.716***  0.623*** 0.477*** 0.556*** 
P-value [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Number of observations 39,446 39,446 39,446   39,446 39,446 39,446 
Fixed Effects FF48/Year Firm/Year FF48-year  FF48/Year Firm/Year FF48-year 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Likelihood Ratio/Adjusted R2 36,323*** 39,675*** 37,437***   0.380 0.339 0.394 
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Panel B: Repurchases and total employee stock options 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Repurchase/lagged market capital 
 Tobit   OLS 
Total options o/s *frequent 0.157*** 0.172*** 0.162***  0.147*** 0.186*** 0.150*** 
 (43.03) (14.81) (44.86)  (9.25) (11.29) (9.36) 
Total options o/s * moderate 0.099*** 0.111*** 0.101***  0.090*** 0.113*** 0.092*** 
 (29.56) (8.27) (30.74)  (5.91) (7.07) (6.02) 
Total options o/s * infrequent 0.081*** 0.103*** 0.079***  0.074*** 0.106*** 0.073*** 
 (35.31) (7.90) (34.92)  (5.43) (6.87) (5.40) 
Total options o/s * no repurchases 0.004 0.013 0.005  0.007** 0.032*** 0.007** 
 (0.90) (1.04) (1.35)  (2.29) (5.63) (2.30) 
Options exercised * frequent 0.252*** 0.190*** 0.229***  0.304*** 0.214*** 0.290*** 
 (16.62) (4.59) (15.18)  (5.69) (4.18) (5.40) 
Options exercised * moderate 0.093*** 0.075 0.080***  0.173*** 0.121** 0.158*** 
 (6.71) (1.46) (5.81)  (3.06) (2.21) (2.81) 
Options exercised. * infrequent 0.021 -0.068 0.022  0.029 -0.057 0.020 
 (0.68) (-1.30) (0.56)  (0.60) (-1.12) (0.42) 
Options exercised * no repurchases -0.013 0.006 -0.012  -0.046*** -0.040*** -0.047*** 
 (-0.73) (0.11) (-0.64)  (-5.07) (-3.01) (-4.85) 
Options granted * frequent 0.002 0.037 0.002  -0.009 0.067 -0.008 
 (0.14) (0.89) (0.12)  (-0.15) (1.10) (-0.13) 
Options granted * moderate 0.151** 0.124* 0.160*  0.126* 0.092* 0.130* 
 (2.11) (1.95) (1.90)  (1.91) (1.85) (1.88) 
Options granted * infrequent -0.008 0.032 -0.009  -0.027 0.005 -0.026 
 (-0.96) (0.81) (-0.98)  (-0.78) (0.13) (-0.75) 
Options granted* no repurchases -0.042*** -0.050 -0.032***  0.005 0.010 0.007 
 (-3.52) (-1.48) (-2.74)  (0.89) (1.23) (1.33) 
F-tests with p-values               
Total options o/s (freq-infreq) 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.083***  0.073*** 0.080*** 0.077*** 
P-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Options exercised. (freq-infreq) 0.231*** 0.258*** 0.207***  0.275*** 0.271*** 0.270*** 
P-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Options granted (freq-infreq) 0.010 0.005 0.011  -0.036 0.072 -0.018 
P-value [0.634] [0.920] [0.683]  [0.799] [0.377] [0.803] 
        
Number of observations  37,324  37,324  37,324    37,324  37,324  37,324 
Fixed Effects FF 48/Year Firm/Year FF48-year  FF 48/Year Firm/Year FF48-year 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Likelihood Ratio/Adjusted R2  26,092***   26,625***   26,367***    0.394 0.305 0.399 
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Online Appendix 
OA1 
Transition matrix for quarters of repurchases 
This table compares the propensity of a firm to repurchase in a certain fiscal quarter in the current year, 
conditional on the fiscal quarter in which it repurchased last year. Panel A presents the results for infrequent 
repurchasers and Panel B for moderate repurchasers. Cell(i, j) presents the fraction of firms that repurchase 
in ith fiscal quarter in yeart and jth fiscal quarter in yeart+1.  
 
    Yeart+1 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Panel A: Infrequent repurchasers 
Y
ea
r t
 
Q1 13.02% 6.74% 11.64% 13.02% 
Q2 1.01% 0.85% 0.73% 0.78% 
Q3 5.73% 3.44% 6.54% 6.06% 
Q4 7.13% 4.21% 7.59% 11.51% 
       
Panel B: Moderate repurchasers 
Y
ea
r t
 
Q1 17.58% 9.21% 17.94% 19.92% 
Q2 4.86% 2.66% 4.15% 5.78% 
Q3 16.56% 8.78% 18.25% 18.10% 
Q4 14.80% 8.05% 15.94% 17.42% 
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OA2 
Undervaluation index for frequent and infrequent repurchasers 
This table examines the undervaluation index for frequent and infrequent repurchasers during the period 
1990 to 2016. The Undervaluation index is the sum of the quintile ranks based on size (smallest: 5, largest: 
1), past returns (lowest return: 5, highest return: 1), and book-to-market (Highest: 5, Lowest: 1). 
Repurchases by firms with U-index > 10 are more likely to be motivated by undervaluation, while those 
with U-index < 6 are less likely to be motivated by undervaluation. Numbers in the table denote the 
percentages of frequent/infrequent repurchasers with U-index > 10 or U-index < 6 across different periods. 
 
 
  Undervaluation index < 6   Undervaluation index > 10 
  Frequent Infrequent 
T-stat of 
difference 
 Frequent Infrequent 
T-stat of 
difference 
1990-1999 20.8% 11.7% 12.9  24.4% 33.4% 10.5 
Number of 
observations 
1,087 684   1,277 1,946  
2000-2009 25.3% 16.2% 13.4  18.0% 27.0% 12.6 
Number of 
observations 
1,878 1,038   1,337 1,734  
2010-2016 31.4% 17.0% 16.6  11.9% 22.4% 13.0 
Number of 
observations 
1,941 610   736 803  
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OA3 
Variation in option compensation with repurchase frequency 
This table reports the options compensation for frequent, moderate, and infrequent repurchasers 
respectively. Panel A reports the results for total options outstanding, exercised and granted from 
Compustat during 2004 to 2016. Panel B uses executive options outstanding and granted from 
Execucomp (for top five executives) over 1992 to 2016. All option variables are reported as a 
percentage of shares outstanding. Please refer to the appendices for detailed variable definitions. 
Last column reports the differences between frequent and infrequent repurchasers; ***, **, and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Total stock options from Compustat 
  Frequent Moderate Infrequent Frequent - Infrequent 
Period 2004–2016 
      
Total Options Outstanding 6.75 6.72 6.57 0.18  
Total options exercised 1.17 1.04 0.91 0.26***  
Total options granted 0.96 1.1 1.2 -0.24***  
Number of observations 8,816  4,736  4,799      
 
 
Panel B: Stock options for top five executives (from Execucomp) 
  Frequent Moderate Infrequent Frequent - Infrequent 
Period 1992–2016 
      
Executive options outstanding 19.75 22.46 22.28 -2.53***  
Executive options granted 3.42 4.05 4.26 -0.83***  
Number of observations 10,630  5,878  5,764      
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